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ABSTRACT
The progression of gender balance in top positions at big corporations in Nordic countries has not 
lived up to the expectations. Inspired by studies emphasizing the crucial role of top management 
in gaining support for gender-equality measures to make changes happen, we set out to investi-
gate what kind of policies top managers in Norway would prioritize to further gender balance in 
the executive ranks. We found that active recruitment policies receive the strongest support and 
quota and preferential-treatment policies the least support. We found clear similarities between 
men and women in the ranking of measures, although women generally indicated stronger support 
for most measures. We found no differences related to gender composition of the management 
group, but some differences across company types (subject to CBQ or not) were revealed. Although 
corporate-board quotas received the least support, there was no indication that these measures 
were strongly objected.
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Introduction
In Nordic countries, as is the case globally, top management positions in the corpo-rate world are predominantly held by males. In these countries, widely recognized for their gender-equality progress (Lister 2009; Melby et al. 2009; Teigen & Skjeie 
2017), continued male dominance has been characterized as a gender-equality paradox, 
with family-friendly welfare-state policies, welcoming women into the labor market in 
great numbers, but not when it comes to reaching the corporate world’s executive ranks 
(Datta Gupta et al. 2008; Hakim 2011; Mandel & Semyonov 2006; Shalev 2008). In 
any case, there is little doubt that the progression of gender balance in top positions at 
big corporations in Nordic countries has not been in line with expectations domestically 
or globally.
This continued male dominance and lack of will to take action in the business realm 
to alter male-dominated structures constitute an important context for why the Norwe-
gian government in 2003 adopted gender quotas for corporate boards (CBQs) (Teigen 
2015, 2018). CBQs have been effective in furthering gender balance on boards in the 
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companies that are part of the regulation, but few signs indicate that any ripple effects 
were generated from gender-balanced corporate boards to improving gender balance in 
top management positions. A major reason might be because CBQs were not designed 
to recruit women into executive ranks. As argued by Dobbin et al. (2015), some policies 
appear to appeal less to managers than others. For instance, in an American context, 
Dobbin et al. (2015) find that control-oriented, state-imposed policies, in particular, may 
have elicited unintended negative effects. If this also applies in a Norwegian context, 
could CBQ have had a demotivating effect and contributed to the lack of ripple effects 
from CBQs in Norway? 
This article is inspired by a ‘call to bring the managers back’ into the study of work-
place inequality, emphasizing the crucial role of top managers for promoting equality 
and diversity in the workplace (Castilla 2011; Dobbin et al. 2015). We set out to inves-
tigate what kinds of policies top managers in Norway would prioritize to further gender 
balance in top management. We argue that initiatives have been tried out to further 
gender balance in top positions, but little is known about what initiatives top manag-
ers actually believe in and are engaged by, which assumingly is important for making 
change happen. 
We will examine possible gender differences among top managers in their degree 
of support for different gender-equality policies, based on the expectation that such 
differences send a message about what the main obstacles are to advancing gender bal-
ance in top positions in the corporate world. Extant literature has shown a growing 
gender egalitarianism and that women in general support gender-equality policies more 
fervently than men (Davis & Greenstein 2009; Inglehart & Norris 2003; Knight & 
Brinton 2017), but less is known about possible gender differences among top managers. 
A study by Teigen and Wängnerud (2009) indicates that within several sectors in Nor-
way and Sweden, not only are women in top management positions more supportive of 
gender-equality policies than men, but women business elites are also more moderate 
in their support than women in other types of elite realms. According to the ‘queen bee’ 
theory, women in highly male-dominated sectors may reproduce instead of challenge the 
gender hierarchy because they adjust to and assimilate into the male culture (Derks et al. 
2016). Hence, women who have managed to break through the glass ceiling and become 
top managers at private-sector companies may not necessarily diverge from their male 
counterparts in their views on gender-equality policies and initiatives, or at least not all 
types of initiatives.
Using this backdrop for the present study, we investigate the support from top 
managers within the biggest corporations in Norway for various initiatives to promote 
gender balance among top management. On the basis of a survey among top managers 
at the 200 biggest Norwegian companies by revenue, including both companies that 
are subject to CBQ regulation and companies that are not, we examine what types of 
initiatives female and male managers believe in most strongly and which they support 
the least. We also discuss whether and how top managers’ ranking of gender-equality 
measures, including quota policies, can help in understanding the lack of ‘ripple effects’ 
from CBQs.
The paper is guided by four research questions: First, what gender-equality mea-
sures are most and least supported by top managers? Second, are female top managers 
more supportive of gender-equality initiatives than their male colleagues and does their 
supports vary among different types of initiatives? Third, we explore possible gender 
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differences further and ask whether female top managers diverge less from their male 
counterparts in more-gender-balanced than less-gender-balanced management groups. 
Fourth, in order to get a better understanding of the relationship between gender-quota 
regulations on corporate boards and top managers’ opinions on measures to further 
gender balance in top management, we ask whether support for gender-equality mea-
sures differ based on whether a company is subject to CBQ regulations or not?
In our examination of top managers’ support of different gender-equality measures, 
we follow Dobbin et al. (2015), and differentiate between measures that approach man-
agers’ behavior, such as management training and recruitment, on the one hand, and 
measures that constrain managers’ discretion to discriminate, such as different types of 
control systems, on the other hand. 
The paper is structured as follows. First, we present central aspects of gender-equal-
ity policies in Norway as an important context for the study of gender-equality measures 
to increase gender balance in top management in Norwegian business life. Second, we 
present literature on conditions for successful implementation of equality policies, as 
well as literature on gender differences in support of gender-equality measures. Next, 
we present our data, method, and results of analyses on our four research questions. 
Finally, we examine our findings in light of the patterns of top managers’ support for 
gender-equality measures and how their priorities can help us understand obstacles to 
gender-equality advancements. We also reflect on the implications suggested by consis-
tent gender differences in support for gender-equality measures and how our findings 
relate to Norwegian mandates on gender quotas for corporate boards. 
The Nordic gender equality policy context
The Nordic gender equality model is characterized by policies instituted by the state 
(Teigen 2018), and to a lesser degree by policies developed by companies and other labor 
market actors. Generally, Nordic gender-equality policies comprise three pillars: gender-
equality legislation, gender-quota policies, and family-friendly welfare-state policies.
Norway, as the first among the Nordic countries passed the Gender Equality Act in 
1978,1 which took effect in 1979. The law was innovative in the sense that it combined 
prohibition of gender-based discrimination with positive duties and positive differential 
treatment (affirmative action) to promote gender equality. The explicit provision in favor 
of positive action was an important reason why gender-equality policies in Norway have 
emphasized gender quotas and positive-action policies, and why this has been empha-
sized more in Norway compared with other Nordic countries (Teigen 2012, 2018). 
Gender-quota policies were established in Norway to promote and regulate gen-
der parity in decision-making assemblies. Since 1981, the Gender Equality Act stated 
that both genders should be represented on public committees, and since 1988, the law 
mandated gender parity, at least 40% for each gender, on state-appointed commissions, 
etc. The same regulation was included in the Municipal Act since 1992 for municipal 
commissions. Most political parties voluntarily have adopted gender-parity policies as 
well. Since the mid-1970s, five of the major Norwegian political parties adopted such 
measures. The Conservative Party, Progress Party, and Green Party have no such regu-
lations. Party quotas also imply a ‘zipper system’, in which candidates of each gender 
alternate on election lists, as well as demand at least 40% of each gender on internal 
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party bodies. For about 25 years, the only statutory gender-quota procedure in Norway 
was applied to public committees. In 2003, the Norwegian Parliament adopted gender 
quotas for corporate boards, including the boards of public limited companies (PLCs), 
inter-municipal companies, and state-owned companies. Legislated corporate-board 
quotas were expanded to include cooperative companies and municipal companies in 
2008 and 2009, respectively (Teigen 2018). Numerous, but mostly small- and medium-
size private limited companies are not subject to gender-quota laws. Expansion of the 
scope of the legislation to include these companies, especially the largest of them, has 
been discussed, but has not been taken up by the right-wing government that came to 
power in 2013.
Work-family policies in Norway, as in other Nordic countries, are built on the dual-
worker/dual-career family model (Ellingsæter & Leira 2006), and they receive massive 
support among the population (Hellevik & Hellevik 2012). Key elements in promoting 
gender equality have been the right to job-protected and generously compensated leave 
for both parents in connection with child birth, and publicly subsidized, high-quality 
child care (Ellingsæter & Leira 2006). Norway was the first country to introduce a quota 
for fathers in the parental-leave scheme (Brandth & Kvande 2013). As for daycare, there 
long had been an unmet demand in Norway, particularly for the youngest children, but 
today, the vast majority of children below school age attend a kindergarten (Ellingsæter 
et al. 2017). Although Norwegian work-family policies ease the combination of paid 
work and childcare for both parents, it is also noticeable that generous family-friendly 
policies may have counterproductive and unintended consequences for women’s power 
in the labor market, such as the concentration of women in public-sector jobs, high part-
time working rates among women, an underrepresentation of women in top positions 
in industry and commerce, and a persistent gender gap in wages (Datta Gupta et al. 
2008; Mandel & Semyonov 2006). The massive and continued male dominance in top 
positions in the business sector is a particular visible sign of prevailing unequal gender 
relations in the Nordic countries, as characterizing all the Nordic countries, with some 
indications of Denmark lagging behind (Niskanen 2011). Some also argue that the com-
pressed wage structure in Norway, as well as in the Nordic countries, makes it expensive 
to outsource housework tasks, which would otherwise facilitate long working hours 
for both partners in a couple (Datta Gupta et al. 2008; Petersen 2002). However, Korpi 
et al. (2013) disagree with the idea that well-developed work-family policies damage 
highly educated women’s career prospects. 
Measured impact and top managers’ engagement
While much research has analyzed the sources of inequality and gender imbalance and 
the adoption of policies (the politics of policies), fewer studies have been conducted to 
analyze the implementation and success of policies and programs to counter gender 
inequalities (Engeli & Mazur 2018). However, studies of effects from policies and initia-
tives to promote gender balance and diversity in the workplace are growing in impor-
tance, and a main finding is that programs and measures that engage managers are the 
most successful in terms of integrating equality and diversity (Dobbin et al. 2015).
In a major study of 816 establishments in the US between 1971 and 2002, Dobbin 
et al. (2015) used panel data to explore the effects of various types of reforms typically 
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adopted to promote equality and diversity at the workplace. They distinguish between 
four groups of measures. The first group comprises those that aim to engage managers. 
For instance, special recruitment (i.e., affirmative action) and management training have 
been found to engage managers in recruiting, nominating, and training women and 
minorities. A second group of measures aims to restrict managers from discriminating 
through different types of control systems, such as job tests, performance ratings, and 
grievance systems. The idea is to prevent discriminatory behavior by managers, instead 
of engaging them. Such measures have elicited opposition among managers, rendering 
them counterproductive. A third group of measures aim to increase transparency. Job-
opening transparency is emphasized, as well as formal, explicit job ladders, to stipulate 
and define eligibility for jobs and pathways upward. A fourth group of reforms estab-
lishes diversity and equality monitoring through the appointment of experts to take 
charge. The assumption is that monitoring for diversity will force managers to scrutinize 
themselves for biases, and that evaluation apprehension will reduce rebellion against 
discretion-control practices. 
Because categorizations by Dobbin et al. (2015) are taken from U.S. companies they 
are not necessarily transferrable to a Norwegian business context, where equality and/or 
diversity policies at the corporate level are less developed. Moreover, they apply to the 
effects of different initiatives, not to top managers’ support for various tools, which is 
the topic of our paper, and their study also covers the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, whereas 
we use more recent data (from 2014). Still, we believe that managers’ support of dif-
ferent measures along the distinction between, more or less, control-oriented measures 
and the degree to which they put constraints on managers’ discretion may shed light on 
barriers to change in a Norwegian context as well. 
Although the survey used in the present article was not designed to comply with the 
research by Dobbin et al. (2015), our analysis of the first research question concerning 
what gender-equality measures are most and least supported by top managers is guided 
by a distinction between measures that may involve and engage managers on the one 
hand, and more regulatory-related measures imposed on them on the other hand. 
Gender differences, role models, and ‘queen bees’
Cultural attitudes toward gender equality have changed and become more positive glob-
ally. Still, women are generally more concerned with gender equality and more support-
ive of gender-equality policies than men (Davis & Greenstein 2009; Inglehart & Norris 
2003). Yet, little is known about gender differences in attitudes among men and women 
who live relatively desegregated, for example, men and women in the highest-ranked, 
highest-paid, and most-influential corporate positions. However, Norwegian and Swed-
ish leadership studies from the early 2000s indicate significant gender differences in 
attitudes on gender-equality measures within different elite groups, although women 
managers in elite business ranks are less supportive than women on elite levels in other 
sectors (Teigen & Wängnerud 2009). Nevertheless, these findings indicate that gender 
inequality is perpetuated by men, and that the presence of more women in top manage-
ment will make a positive impact on women’s career opportunities. Kunze and Miller 
(2017) find that there is less of a gender gap in promotions at companies where there are 
more women working as top managers; they concluded that increased gender balance in 
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corporate management may have a positive effect on the recruitment of women in lower 
ranks of the organization. Huffman’s (2013) study points in the same direction by pro-
viding a strong critique of supply-side explanations on wage inequality and other forms 
of workplace stratification, with an emphasis on the gendered nature of organizational 
structures and processes, the important role of managers in general, and the role women 
managers can play.
The importance of women role models in male-dominated realms has been empha-
sized with the argument that more women in these realms have an important motivating 
effect on other women, who then become more motivated to pursue careers in male-
dominated realms as a consequence of the existence of women role models (Ambrose & 
Schminke 2015; Terjesen et al. 2009; Wolbrecht & Campbell 2007).  
However, another camp of literature says women managers in male-dominated 
organizations may reproduce rather than challenge the gender hierarchy (Derks et al. 
2016). The argument is that the few women who have made it to the top may choose 
to distance themselves from junior women because they may feel a need to reduce their 
associations with less-successful women in the organization (Kanter 1977). Women 
not helping women has been called the ‘queen bee’ phenomenon, understood as a psy-
chological mechanism that Derks et al. (2016) argue is caused by hostility and gen-
der discrimination women often face in male-dominated work settings. Essentially, the 
few women in male-dominated fields – token women – have a tendency to adjust and 
assimilate into the male culture and become part of the culture of discrimination against 
women. The point is not that woman ‘queen bees’ wish to pull the ladder up after they 
ascend to the high ranks, but that assimilation is the name of the game for the women 
to ‘survive’ in a male-dominated context. The ‘queen bee’ metaphor describes the phe-
nomenon in which some women assimilate into the masculine culture that dominates 
top management in big corporations, thereby legitimizing gender inequality (Derks et 
al. 2016). However, there is little evidence on whether women top managers actually act 
as ‘queen bees’. It may be that the relatively few women who pursue careers in business 
life differ from women in general more than they do from men in their sector (Adams & 
Funk 2012). According to Kanter (1977), the more gender balance in a top-management 
group, the more likely it is that women in that group will be viewed as individuals and 
not as ‘symbols’ or ‘tokens’.
Thus, the second question in our analysis is about whether female top managers 
are more supportive of gender-equality initiatives than their male colleagues and about 
whether their support varies among different types of initiatives. We then proceed with 
analyzing if female top managers diverge less from their male counterparts in more-
gender-balanced than less-gender-balanced management groups, and whether support 
for gender-equality measures differ based on whether a company is part of CBQ regula-
tions, that is, have CBQ regulations resulted in top managers being more supportive of 
such measures?
Data and analytical method
To explore our research questions, we used an e-mail based survey on top management, 
recruitment, and gender balance among top executives, conducted among top managers 
in the 200 biggest companies in Norway in 2014. The companies were picked from the 
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DN500 list, which contains the 500 largest companies in Norway by revenue. The 200 
biggest companies include PLCs (stock-listed companies), publicly owned companies, 
and private limited companies. The first two are subject to CBQ regulation, and the 
third is not. The survey was undertaken by the Institute for Social Research in Oslo 
and administered through the online survey company Questback. The questionnaire 
was sent to all managers in the top executive ranks, including both CEOs, managers 
in line positions, and managers in staff positions. Their e-mails were collected from 
the companies’ websites or by direct contact with the companies. However, in some 
cases, the e-mail addresses did not work, which probably reflects the large turnover in 
some top management groups. Moreover, some companies were unwilling to provide 
us with the top managers’ contact information and offered us to send an inquiry via a 
contact person instead. There were also some companies that picked only one manager 
to participate in the survey. A total of 404 top managers responded to the questionnaire, 
which amounts to 31% of those who actually received the survey. The response rate was 
somewhat higher for women than for men (45% vs 28%). Thus, men are somewhat 
underrepresented in the net sample compared with the gross sample, which is also the 
case for top leaders in the biggest companies (by revenue), including companies with 
oil-related activities, and managers in companies that do not fall under the gender quota 
law. However, the net sample includes both men and women top managers from a vari-
ety of industries and company types (both companies that are subject to CBQ regulation 
and companies that are not), thereby providing a unique source for capturing top man-
agers’ experiences, practices, and opinions in Norway. A total of 173 companies were 
represented in the net sample.2 For further information about the survey design, sample, 
data-collection procedure, and response rate, see Halrynjo and Kitterød (2015).  
The survey captured top managers’ views on several topics about women and top 
management, as well as gender quotas for boards, management groups, etc., and also 
some information about their family situation, educational background, the composi-
tion of the top leader group, etc. We gauged participants’ support for different measures 
to promote gender balance in top positions by asking them to what extent they believed 
in the importance of each item on a list of 12 measures. Participants were presented 
with the following possible conditions to achieve better gender balance in executive 
management: 
 (1) Leadership programs for women (Female Future, Futura, etc.)
 (2) Internal mentor arrangements/leadership programs
 (3) Requirements for reports and visibility of gender balance at the executive level
 (4) Active recruitment policies for middle management
 (5) Active recruitment policies for the executive level
 (6)  Preferential rights for female applicants when faced with applicants of equal com-
petence
 (7) Gender quotas for boards
 (8) Raise women’s awareness of career building
 (9) More equal distribution of parental leave between mothers and fathers
(10)  More equal distribution of children/family responsibilities between mothers and 
fathers
(11) Better opportunities for career comebacks after the “toddler phase”
(12) Increased education levels among women
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The last four measures (I, J, K, and L) refer to more general gender-equality policies than 
to measures at the company level and are, therefore, not included in our analyses in the 
present paper. 
Participants were asked to assess the importance of each measure on a scale from 
one (very unimportant) to five (very important). In the analyses in the present paper, 
we recoded the variables from minus 2 to 2, so that negative values reflect that a mea-
sure is considered unimportant, and positive values reflect that a measure is considered 
important. Observations with missing values (varying from three to seven for the nine 
statements that we looked at) are coded as 0.
As for respondents, we included top managers from private limited companies (not 
subject to gender-quota laws), top managers from PLCs (stock-listed companies/subject 
to gender-quota laws), and top managers from state- and municipality-owned compa-
nies (subject to gender-quota laws) in the analyses. We excluded a few managers from 
companies without gender-quota mandates, especially various types of foundations. We 
ended up with 381 observations in the analyses, 107 women and 274 men.  
In the empirical analysis, we started by investigating which measures are most 
and least supported by women and men top managers, then we investigated more 
closely the extent to which there are gender differences in top managers’ support of 
various types of measures to promote gender balance in top management groups. To 
summarize the data, we constructed two indices, one on measures that approach man-
agers’ behavior, such as management training and recruitment, and one on measures 
that constrain managers’ discretion to discriminate, such as different types of control 
systems. In addition, we included two single statements that do not fit into any of 
the two indices. We employed multivariate analyses [ordinary least square regression 
(OLS) and logistic regression] to control for relevant differences between female and 
male top leaders. The multivariate analyses also allowed us to explore whether female 
managers diverge less from their male counterparts in more-gender-balanced than in 
less-gender-balanced management groups, and whether managers at companies subject 
to CBQs are more supportive of gender-equality measures than managers in companies 
not subject to CBQs. 
Results
Most support for active recruitment measures
First, we examine women and men top managers’ opinions by looking at the average 
scores for the eight different measures to achieve better gender balance in top manage-
ment (those denoted A-H in the section above), as well as the proportion with the two 
highest scores (1 or 2), meaning whether they regard the tool as rather or very important 
(Table 1). Most of these measures refer to tools implemented at the company level, but 
one of them (the one denoted A) stands out in that it refers to more general leadership 
programs, for example, programs arranged by the Confederation of Norwegian Enter-
prises, and not at the company level. However, all the measures presented in the survey 
have been widely discussed in debates on gender equality in business life in Norway and 
are well known by most top managers. We sorted the eight measures according to their 
average scores, with those with the highest scores at the top based on the women top 
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managers’ answers. To ease the comparison of women’s and men’s rankings, we have 
marked the order in parenthesis. 
The measure that received the most support is active recruitment policies for middle 
management. Eighty-four percent of women and 80% of men top managers believe 
this to be either a rather or very important measure.3 A significant majority of both 
female and male top managers also support active recruitment policies for the execu-
tive level. However, while women support such measures almost to the same extent as 
active recruitment policies for middle management, men seem to believe somewhat less 
in recruitment policies for the executive level than for middle management. Measures 
such as raising women’s awareness of career building and internal mentor arrangements 
or leadership development programs also received strong support from both female and 
male top managers. However, leadership programs for women received more modest 
support, with only 33% of women and 42% of men believing that this is an important 
measure, a significant finding given that this statement refers to more general leadership 
programs, and not to programs arranged at the company level. Regulations such as pref-
erential treatment for women also received modest support from top managers of both 
genders, and the same is true for reports and monitoring of gender balance and gender 
quotas for corporate boards, with only 25% of male top managers believing that gender 
quotas have any importance at all.4 Although women are somewhat more positive, only 
44% believe gender quotas are either rather or very important. 
Generally, top managers’ support of gender-equality measures is strong, with a clear 
tendency for women and men top managers to support the same measures. They differ 
only slightly in the rankings for different tools. Both women and men seem to believe 
more in active recruitment policies and internal mentor arrangements than in more regu-
latory measures, which actually fit well with the finding by Dobbin et al. (2015) that 
measures and reforms that engage managers appeal more than regulatory measures that 
are imposed on managers and constrain their discretion. 
Table 1  Average scores on various conditions to achieve better gender balance in executive  
management, and the percentage who believe that various conditions are rather or  






Women Men Women Men
Active recruitment policies for middle management (D)a 1.31 (1) 1.01 (1) 84 80
Active recruitment policies for the executive level (E) 1.30 (2) 0.87 (3) 85 72
Raise women’s awareness of career building (H) 1.17 (3) 0.90 (2) 84 73
Internal mentor arrangements (B) 0.94 (4) 0.68 (4) 71 67
Reports and monitoring of gender balance (C) 0.51 (5) –0.61 (7) 55 34
Gender quotas for corporate boards (G) 0.13 (6) –0.42 (6) 44 25
Leadership programs for women (A) 0.04 (7) 0.04 (5) 33 42
Preferential treatment of women (F) –0.23 (8) –0.71 (8) 23 17
a The letters in parenthesis refer to the letters indicating the order in which the questions were asked. The 
full wording of each question is shown in the section on data and analytical method.
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However, the bivariate analyses in Table 1 indicate that women top managers 
believe more in several of the tools for achieving gender equality in top management 
than men managers do, and that they are also somewhat less skeptical of regula-
tory measures than men. Still, men and women have the same average score when 
it comes to leadership programs for women. In fact, more men than women believe 
this is a rather or very important measure (42% vs 33%). To get further insight into 
the patterns behind the average scores reported in Table 1, we provided a detailed 
frequency distribution for each measure in Table 2. We noticed that even though both 
male and female managers tend to support the same measures, several measures are 
more often regarded as very important (score 2) by female leaders. Men are more 
prone than women to opt for score 1, meaning they believe the measure in question is 
somewhat, but not very, important. Furthermore, the results suggest that there is no 
consistent pattern of male top managers being more indifferent (do not know/cannot 
decide) than women top managers. On some measures (such as preferential treatment 
of women), the percentage with a score of 0 is, in fact, somewhat higher for women 
than for men, while the reverse pattern is observed for other measures (such as active 
recruitment for middle management). However, some measures are looked upon as 
very unimportant by a large portion of men top managers, while women’s views are 
Table 2 Frequencies for scores on various conditions to achieve better gender balance in execu-
tive management (–2 = very unimportant, 2 = very important) as a percentage 
Women Men
–2 –1 0 1 2 Total –2 –1 0 1 2 Total
Active recruitment  
policies for middle  
management (D)a 1 1 14 34 50 100 2 1 17 54 26 100
Active recruitment 
policies for the executive 
level (E) 1 0 14 39 46 100 3 3 23 50 22 100
Raise women’s awareness 
of career building (H) 2 3 11 45 39 100 1 5 21 47 25 100
Internal mentor 
arrangements/leadership 
programs (B) 0 3 26 46 25 100 3 6 23 53 14 100
Reports and monitoring 
of gender balance (C) 6 14 26 33 21 100 12 20 34 30 4 100
Gender quotas for  
corporate boards (G) 12 18 27 32 11 100 24 24 26 20 5 100
Leadership programs for 
women (A) 6 26 34 24 9 100 13 19 27 37 5 100
Preferential treatment  
of women (F) 11 30 36 18 6 100 29 31 24 15 1 100
Women and men (N=108/278).
a The letters in parenthesis refer to the letters indicating the order in which the questions were asked. The full 
wording of each question is shown in the section on data and analytical method. 
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more moderate (gender quotas for corporate boards and preferential treatment for 
women). For instance, 29% of men and 11% of women top managers believe that 
preferential treatment of women is very unimportant.
Considerable gender differences across measures
Our results so far suggest that both women and men top managers believe more in 
recruitment and training measures than regulatory measures to promote gender balance 
in top management groups, and that women are more supportive than men of the first 
type of tools and somewhat less opposed to the latter. To further investigate gender dif-
ferences in support for different types of measures, we ran multivariate analyses with 
controls for relevant factors, such as for instance the managers’ position in the top 
leader group and their field of education. We also explored whether gender differences 
vary with the gender composition of the top management group and whether top man-
agers in companies with and without CBQs differ in their support for various types of 
tools to promote gender equality in top positions.  
To summarize measures, we constructed two additive indices, one called ‘Active 
recruitment’ and another called ‘Regulatory measures’. The first one comprises the three 
tools that approach managers’ behavior, such as active recruitment policies for middle 
management, active recruitment policies for the executive level, and internal mentor 
arrangement/leadership programs. The second one comprises regulatory initiatives, such 
as requirements for reports and visibility of gender balance at the executive level, prefer-
ential treatment of women, and gender quotas for boards.5,6 Because the two remaining 
statements, ‘Leadership programs for women’ and ‘Raise women’s awareness of career 
building’, did not, neither theoretically nor empirically, fit into any of the two indices, 
we included them as individual statements in the analyses.
Like the single statements, the indices range from -2 to 2. The average scores are 
presented in Table 3 for the whole sample and separately for women and men.7 In accor-
dance with the results provided in Table 1, the active-recruitment dimension receives 
much support from both women and men, while regulatory measures receive less sup-
port. For women, the average score on the active recruitment dimension is 1.17, while 
the score on the regulatory measures dimension is 0.13. For men, the corresponding 
averages are 0.86 and -0.40, respectively. Thus, women support the first type of mea-
sures to a greater extent than men and are less negative toward the second type of 
measures. The two indices as well as two single statements (A and H) constitute our 
dependent variables in the multivariate analyses. Because they are all continuous vari-
ables, we use OLS.  
In the multivariate analyses, the variables respondents’ gender, gender composition 
of the management group, and company type (subject to CBQs or not) comprise our 
independent variables. In addition, we include controls such as respondents’ age, age of 
youngest child (including no children), respondents’ position in the management group, 
and respondents’ field of education. Because more leaders from the same company par-
ticipated in the survey, we controlled for this dependency by using an estimation proce-
dure that yields robust standard errors. When interpreting the results, it is important to 
remember that the analyses are based on a small sample, which tends to yield imprecise 
estimates and makes attaining statistical significance difficult. 
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Table 3  Descriptive statistics on dependent and independent variables in the multivariate analyses, 
averages, and percentages
All Women Men
Dependent variables, average scores 
Scales/statements on conditions to further gender 
balance in executive management (-2 = very unim-
portant, 2 = very important) 
Active recruitment (recruitment for middle and top management and 
internal mentors - statements B, D, E a) 0.95 1.17 0.86
Regulatory measures (reporting, preferential treatment, and gender 
quotas for boards – statements C, F, G) –0.25 0.13 –0.40
Raise women’s awareness of career building (statement H) 0.97 1.16 0.90





Gender composition of the management group
Only men (91–100%) 28 14 33
Most men (61–90%) 47 46 47
Gender-balanced (≤60% men) 25 40 20
Company type
Private-limited 44 38 46
Stock-listed (quotas) 27 25 27
Publicly owned company (quotas) 30 36 27
Respondent’s age (years) 
28–44 19 31 15
45–54 51 51 50
55–67 30 18 35
Children (years) 
0–9 20 24 19
10–14 18 18 18
15–19 23 22 24
20 + 33 22 37
No children 6 13 3
Position in executive management 
CEO/deputy CEO 37 22 42
Staff 30 50 22
Line role, other 34 28 36
Field of education 
Technical/scientific 31 16 37
Finance/business 51 54 50
Law/social sciences/humanities 14 22 12
Other/unknown 3 8 1
Number of observations 381 107 274
a The letters in parenthesis refer to the letters indicating the order in which the questions were asked. The full 
wording of each question is shown in the section on data and analytical method.
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Frequency distributions for the independent variables are presented in Table 3. 
Female and male top managers comprise 28% and 72% of the analysis sample, 
respectively.8 Apart from company type, there are considerable gender differences in 
the distribution of all independent variables. The female leaders generally belong to 
more gender-balanced management groups than men, are somewhat younger, seldom 
have adult children, more often have no children, more often have a staff position in 
the management group, less often have other line positions or a CEO position, and are 
more often educated in the fields of law, social sciences, and humanities, and less often 
in technical or scientific fields.
In Table 4, we present results from OLS regressions with the two indices ‘Active 
recruitment’ and ‘Regulatory measures’, as well as the two single measures ‘Raise wom-
en’s awareness of career building’ and ‘Leadership programs for women’ as the depen-
dent variables. In line with the bivariate analysis presented above, the regression results 
reveal that female top managers believe more in active recruitment measures to further 
gender balance in top management groups than men, and also are less skeptical of regu-
latory measures. The gender differences are considerable and statistically significant (at 
the 0.01 level) even after controlling for the gender composition of the management 
group, company type, the top managers’ age, family situation, management position, 
and field of education. Women also clearly believe more in raising women’s awareness 
of career building than men do (statistically significant at the 0.05 level), and this is true 
even after controlling for a number of relevant factors.
Importantly, however, in line with the average scores in Table 1, the OLS regression 
analysis reveals that women and men do not differ on the extent to which they support 
more general leadership programs for women. Still, as shown in Table 1, more men 
than women managers believe this type of measure is either very or rather important 
(42% vs 33%). To investigate whether this gender difference applies in a multivariate 
framework as well, we constructed a dummy variable in which scores 1 and 2 (rather or 
very important) equal 1 and lower scores (-2, -1, and 0) equal 0. Because our dependent 
variable is a dummy variable, we used logistic regression in the multivariate analysis. 
We included the same set of independent variables as in the OLS analyses. The results 
are reported as odds ratios (see Table 5), which means that the reference group for each 
variable is set to 1, and that coefficients above 1 indicate a positive association, whereas 
coefficients below 1 indicate a negative association. We note that the gender difference 
in support for general leadership programs as a tool to further gender balance in top 
management groups applies also in a multivariate framework. The coefficient is statisti-
cally significant at the 0.10% level. Hence, men seem to believe in such measures more 
than women, and the gender difference is hardly reduced when relevant factors, such as 
the gender composition of the management group, company type, the respondent’s age, 
family situation, management position, and field of education are accounted for.9
Regarding our second research question, we can conclude that even women who 
have managed to break the glass ceiling and become part of a top management group 
are, on average, more supportive of most gender-equality measures than their male 
counterparts, and that this holds also when a number of relevant variables have been 
controlled for. We note, however, that women do not, on average, differ from men in 
their support for more general leadership programs for women, and that fewer women 
than men believe this is an important condition to enhance gender balance in executive 
management in Norway. 
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Table 5  Results from logistic regression analysis of the importance of leadership programs for 
women as a measure to achieve a better gender balance in executive management  






Gender composition of the management  
group (ref= 91–100% men) 
Most men (61–90%) 2.013*** 1.191–3.402
Gender-balanced (<=60% men) 1.243 0.662–3.334
Company type (ref=private limited)
Stock-listed (quotas) 0.725 0.418–1.255
Publicly owned company (quotas) 0.880 0.505–1.531
Respondent’s age (ref=28–44 years)
45–54 years 0.969 0.500–1.877
55–67 years 1.040 0.448–2.418
Children (ref=0–9 years)
10–14 years 0.751 0.336–1.676
15–19 years 1.112 0.537–2.302
20 years + 1.369 0.592–3.168
No children 0.525 0.158–1.740
Position in executive  
management (ref=staff)
CEO/deputy CEO 0.808 0.448–1.449
Line role, other 1.191 0.686–2.071
Field of education (ref=technical/scientific)
Finance/business 0.822 0.522–1.295
Law/social sciences/humanities 0.834 0.487–1.642
Other/unknown 2.323 0.635–8.500
Intercept 0.597 0.264–1.351
N = 381. (95% confidence interval in parentheses).
***=significant at 0.01 level, *=significant at 0.10 level.
Apart from the gender difference, the multivariate analyses presented in Table 4 
reveal few systematic dividing lines in top managers’ views on measures to achieve 
gender balance among top managers. Therefore, it seems safe to conclude that gender 
constitutes the most important and unambiguous dividing line when it comes to top 
managers’ support of different tools to promote gender equality in top management 
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groups in Norway. However, as demonstrated in the bivariate analyses in Table 2, there 
is no clear pattern of women supporting and men being indifferent or skeptical toward 
all types of measures. Vast majorities of both female and male top managers are in favor 
of active recruitment measures, although men are slightly less positive than women. 
Moreover, most female and male top leaders are either indifferent or unsupportive of 
regulatory measures, although women are somewhat less skeptical than men.
Turning to our third research question, whether female managers diverge less from 
their male counterparts in more-gender-balanced than less-gender-balanced management 
groups, we re-ran the multivariate analyses with an interaction term between the respon-
dent’s gender and the gender composition of the management group (results are available 
from the authors by request). As demonstrated in Table 4, contrary to our expectations, 
top managers in gender-balanced top management groups do not differ from those in 
male-dominated groups in their support of various types of measures to advance gender 
balance in top management. Also, the analyses with interactions between the respondent’s 
gender and the gender balance in his or her management group revealed no statistically 
significant interaction effects. However, the small size of our sample only allows for a 
rather crude categorization of the gender balance in the management group, and it cannot 
be ruled out that a different categorization would have produced other results. Therefore, 
on the basis of our data, we cannot draw a firm conclusion on the relationship between 
the gender balance in management and individual managers’ support for gender-equality 
measures, although the noninteraction between the top managers’ gender and the gender 
composition in the management group is a consistent finding across measures.   
More support for some measures in companies subject to CBQs 
As for our fourth research question, whether support for gender-equality measures differs 
based on whether a company is subject to CBQs or not, the results from the multivariate 
analyses (see Table 4) reveal that managers at companies subject to CBQ laws are more 
in favor of active-recruitment measures to promote gender balance in top management 
than managers in companies that are not subject to CBQs (private limited companies). 
The difference holds for leaders at stock-listed companies, as well as for those at publicly 
owned companies, and it is important to note that it applies even after controlling for 
a lot of relevant factors, including the manager’s gender, position in the management 
group, field of education, and the gender balance in the management group. We further 
note that managers at publicly owned companies are more supportive of/less skeptical 
of regulatory measures than managers at private-limited companies, whereas managers 
at stock-listed companies do not differ from those at private-listed companies in this 
respect. Tools such as ‘Raising women’s awareness of career building’ and ‘Leadership 
programs for women’ are supported to the same extent by leaders in companies subject 
to CBQ laws and leaders in companies that are not subject to CBQ laws.   
Discussion and concluding remarks
In the Introduction to this article, we first addressed a question about what measures 
to further gender balance in top management are the most and least supported by top 
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managers at Norwegian companies. We found that active recruitment policies receive 
the strongest support, and quota and preferential-treatment policies receive the least 
support. Second, we examined gender differences in support patterns and found clear 
similarities between men and women in the ranking of measures, although women are 
generally stronger in their support of all measures, except for leadership programs for 
women, which men in the executive ranks support more than fellow women top manag-
ers. These results also apply in a multivariate framework in which relevant factors are 
accounted for. We believe this is an important finding because it implies that women 
top managers’ stronger support for most gender-equality measures to promote gender 
equality applies irrespective of their position in the management group, field of educa-
tion, whether the company is subject to quota regulation for boards or not, the gen-
der balance in the executive management group and family factors. We then examined 
whether gender differences are less pronounced in gender-balanced management groups 
and found no differences related to the gender composition of top management ranks. 
Neither did we find any consistent pattern tied to company type across different gender-
equality measures distinguishing between CBQ and non-CBQ companies. However, and 
interestingly, top managers at companies subject to CBQs are significantly more sup-
portive of active recruitment policies than top managers at private-limited companies. 
There are no differences in relation to measures geared toward ‘training and encourag-
ing women’, but top managers at publicly owned companies are more supportive of, or 
at least less-skeptical of, regulatory measures than top managers at public-limited and 
private-limited companies. 
Dobbin et al. (2015) argue that equality and diversity are best pursued by imple-
menting measures that motivate and engage top managers. Our analysis indicates over-
whelming support for various gender-equality measures, with the main exceptions being 
only modest support for quota measures and preferential treatment of women. Hence, 
to some extent, we would argue that this broadly shared enthusiasm makes it rather 
difficult to sort out which measures engage top managers, as well as which are most 
effective at pushing for change. However, support for active recruitment policies at the 
middle-management level among both female and male leaders appears strong and solid, 
which we believe is interesting in view of the fact that these fall within the type of mea-
sures that according to Dobbin et al. (2015) are the most effective in bringing about 
change in equality and diversity in companies in the US context.  
Another question is what it actually means when Dobbin et al. (2015) assert that 
measures that engage and motivate top managers are the most effective. Does it mean 
that it does not really matter what kinds of measures are implemented, that is, is it 
simply top managers’ engagement and commitment that matter most? If the type of 
measure does matter, it is worth noting that male top managers are more supportive of 
leadership-development programs for women than their women colleagues. Typically, 
these are programs outside the company, arranged by, for instance, an employer orga-
nization. Why are men more in favor of this than women? Most likely, women are less 
enthusiastic about ‘women programs’ on the basis of their own experiences, illustrating 
that those who have managed to break through the ‘glass-ceiling’ find the gender-bal-
ance problem to be more about organizational matters than ‘fixing other women’. Our 
study shows that gender has an independent and significant effect on support for gender-
equality measures. Although some tools elicit strong support from leaders of both gen-
ders, women more often than men believe these tools are very important, rather than 
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somewhat important. Hence, we do not find support for the ‘queen bee’ mechanism. 
Instead, the analysis points at women in top positions in business life as potential agents 
for change. So, why have we not been witnessing greater gender-equality change at the 
top? One reason may be that women top managers are relatively few and dispersed to 
many companies, with relatively little influence wherever they work. In addition, these 
women are typically placed in staff, not line positions. Hence, their power to assert 
their will may be weaker than that of CEOs and line managers. On the other hand, 
women are more often HR executives, which are strategically important positions when 
it comes to introducing and shepherding internal gender-equality policies.
Furthermore, it might be that although women in top management positions are 
particularly strong supporters of gender-equality measures, they still may act as ‘queen 
bees’ in practice. As long as promotion of gender balance in top management is not a 
high priority in the top management ranks – and maybe not even among women top 
managers (although they are very much in favor of such policies) – there will be con-
cerns about gender-equality backsliding amid other ‘bigger’ strategic considerations in 
the daily management of the company.
As to the question addressed in the introduction to this study, of whether top man-
agers’ ranking of gender-equality measures can contribute to explaining the lack of 
‘ripple effects’ from corporate-board quotas, we may not be able to answer it in full. 
But we may conclude that the lack of enthusiasm for quota policies as a tool to fur-
ther gender balance in top management positions probably has not contributed to any 
‘ripple effects’, nor to motivating top managers to initiate internal gender-equality poli-
cies to promote gender balance in top management. Top managers’ modest enthusiasm 
for quota policies indicate that CBQs are not well-suited for spurring enthusiasm to 
promote gender balance in top management, although they have been quite effective 
in promoting gender balance on corporate boards (Teigen 2015) and are also widely 
supported by top managers as a tool to further gender balance in boards (Kitterød et al. 
2015). 
Nevertheless, our findings suggest that top managers are the most engaged and 
motivated by active recruitment policies, with particular attention paid to middle-man-
agement ranks. This fits well with argument by Dobbin et al. (2015) for policies that 
takes top managers’ discretion into account. Obviously, some companies in Norway 
have developed active recruitment policies to promote gender balance. Still, we know 
that many have not. If more companies develop such policies from the inside, there may 
be prospects to see more change happen. Moreover, our study indicates that the lack of 
ripple effects from gender-balanced corporate boards toward improving gender balance 
in top management ranks may be connected to gender quotas being the least-favored 
measures by top managers in the business sector, although we have no findings indi-
cating that these measures have been counterproductive. Combining different types of 
measures may in fact prove to be what are the most effective. 
In spite of the small sample used in the analyses in the present paper and the under- 
and overrepresentation of certain groups of top managers, we believe that our findings 
contribute to the debate about possible remedies to further gender balance in top leader 
groups in large companies in Norway as well as other countries, and we hope the ques-
tions addressed in the paper will be further researched in future studies with larger and 
completely representative samples.    
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Notes
1  ‘The Act Relating to Gender Equality’, Ministry of Children and Equality, published April 20, 2007, 
https://www.regjeringen.no/en/dokumenter/the-act-relating-to-gender-equality-the-/id454568/ 
(Accessed May 2018).
2  In 64 companies, one of the top managers responded to the survey, in 43 companies two mangers 
responded, in 30 companies three managers responded, and in 36 companies at least four managers 
responded. 
3  The average score is 1.31 and 1.01 among women and men top managers, respectively.
4  The average score for the assessment on the suitability of gender quotas for boards is 0.13 and minus 
0.42 for women and men, respectively.
5  The scales were created by summarizing the scores on the relevant measures, and dividing the sum 
by the number of measures included. 
6  Factor analyses support the theoretical assumptions that the two sets of statements actually do cap-
ture two underlying concepts. In a factor analyses of the three tools included in the active recruitment 
scale, the eigenvalue is 2.06, and in an analysis of the three tools included in the regulatory measures 
scale, the eigenvalue is 1.90. The scale-reliability coefficients are 0.76 and 0.71, respectively. Separate 
analyses for each gender reveal scale-reliability coefficients of 0.73 and 0.66 for women for the two 
scales, respectively, and 0.75 and 0.70 for men.  
7  A few observations with missing values on the variable capturing whether the respondents have 
children or not are excluded from the multivariate analysis. Therefore, the number of observations is 
slightly lower in Table 3 than in Tables 1 and 2 (381 vs 386).  
8  Due to the higher response rate among women than men, women are somewhat overrepresented in 
the net sample compared to the gross sample in which they made up 18% (see Halrynjo & Kitterød 
2015).  
9  A logistic regression analysis in which the top manager’s gender constitutes the only independent 
variable produces an odds ratio of 0.662. Results are available from the authors on request. 
